A person compares prices, delivery times, and specifications. After choosing, they explain that it was the most rational alternative. But did the preference begin with the comparison, or did the comparison start organizing arguments for a preference that already existed?
The scene is illustrative. It doesn't describe an interviewed consumer, nor does it allow us to conclude that any client is inventing justifications. It raises a question in the psychology of decision-making: choices can involve information, context, emotion, and risk perception, while the verbal explanation shows only part of this process.
The thesis of this article is that knowing about these influences should increase communication responsibility, not provide a license to manipulate. Not every choice is impulsive; not every argument is a rationalization. A company cannot identify hidden thoughts from a click, an expression, or a sentence.
What Prospect Theory Investigated
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, in Econometrica. The original article examines choices between alternatives with different probabilities and outcomes. The authors discuss how gains, losses, and reference points influence decisions under risk.
The study works with hypothetical problems answered by students and faculty, with samples that vary between problems; the first pair presented reports N=72. It is not a survey of Brazilian buyers, nor does it demonstrate that every retail purchase follows a single mechanism. Applying the experiment to a commercial situation requires caution.
What the theory allows us to question is the idea that the presentation of outcomes is neutral. The same economic consequence can be perceived differently depending on the reference point used. This doesn't reveal a particular client's motive but helps investigate whether the offer communicates comparison and risk clearly.
Choosing a Product Can Also Mean Avoiding a Loss
In a hypothetical example, a buyer considers replacing a piece of equipment they are already familiar with. The new alternative may promise benefits and require adaptation. The fear of losing stability is not automatically irrational: it can represent legitimate costs of training, maintenance, and transition.
In retail, familiarity with a brand can reduce research effort without guaranteeing the best price-quality ratio. In agribusiness, choosing equipment can involve service and operational compatibility. These examples are analytical, not real cases or estimates of the frequency of biases in specific sectors.
Labeling every preference for the known alternative as resistance to change oversimplifies the decision. The buyer might be evaluating risks that the sales presentation omitted. The useful question is which consequence needs to be clarified, not how to overcome a supposed psychological weakness.
The Client's Explanation Is Not a Motivation Detector
A person might highlight the price because it was decisive. They might highlight it because it's an easy reason to communicate. They might not wish to disclose other reasons. Without additional evidence, none of these possibilities should be presented as fact.
My interpretation is that responsible investigation preserves this uncertainty. Instead of treating speech as a lie or the whole truth, it considers it situated information. The article on the client who said it was expensive delves into this very boundary between a stated objection and an understood motive.
The same applies to preference and justification. Prospect theory does not, by itself, prove that someone chose first and rationalized later. It addresses decisions under risk. Justification processes and social influence require other evidence. Mixing concepts would create an elegant but scientifically imprecise explanation.
In Companies, the Justification Also Needs to Circulate
The McKinsey B2B Pulse 2024 gathered nearly 4,000 decision-makers from 34 sectors in 13 countries, showing a plurality of preferences among in-person, remote, and digital channels. It is an international survey of self-reported answers, not an experiment on rationalization.
In an organizational purchase, the interlocutor may need to explain the choice to other departments. The justification is not necessarily an excuse: it can be a legitimate part of governance. Information on implementation, total cost, and limitations helps in evaluating and communicating a decision, without replacing it with slogans.
The article on the changing B2B buyer connects this need to consultative work. The person who receives the proposal may understand the product but still be unable to demonstrate how it meets the company's process. The commercial responsibility is to provide relevant evidence, not arguments that conceal weaknesses.
The Ethical Limit Appears in the Presentation
Communication that omits costs, exaggerates scarcity, or highlights only a favorable comparison can distort the assessment. Knowing about the influence of reference points should lead to equivalent comparisons, visible conditions, and a reasonable time for decision-making.
This does not mean that every persuasive presentation is improper. It means recognizing that persuasion does not authorize false information or pressure on vulnerabilities. The client needs to be able to understand what they are receiving, what they are paying for, and what uncertainties remain, even when choosing an offer they like.
Human decision-making can be consistent and still involve emotion. Trust, comfort, and identity can be part of the choice without invalidating it. They can also coexist with careful calculation. Reducing everything to impulse impoverishes the analysis just as much as assuming perfect rationality.
A Question for Those Who Sell
There is no technique here for reading the buyer's unconscious, predicting their purchase, or making someone incapable of saying no. The sources support questions about risk and channels; the author's analysis outlines how these questions can improve the quality of information.
The company can verify whether a presentation clarifies or merely favors its own narrative. It can listen to reasons, compare evidence, and admit what it doesn't know. This attitude is less spectacular than claiming mastery over client psychology, but it preserves the possibility of an autonomous choice.
If the client had to justify tomorrow why they didn't buy, would your company have provided enough information for a decision—or just enough arguments to defend the sale?
Sources and Methodology
Kahneman and Tversky — Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 1979. Original article in Econometrica, 47(2), pages 263–291. Experiments on hypothetical choices with students and faculty; samples vary between problems, including N=72 in the first pair presented. Evidence on decisions under risk, not mind-reading of clients or a Brazilian consumer survey.
McKinsey — B2B Pulse 2024. Published on September 12, 2024; nearly 4,000 B2B decision-makers, 34 sectors, eight major industries, and 13 countries. Survey of stated preferences and behaviors; international comparison, not a Brazilian census or causal proof of a strategy.
Opening photograph: illustrative image from the Unsplash stock photo library; does not depict a company or case investigated in this article.